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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
P. S. GUSS dba PHOTO S·OUND
PRODUCTS MANUFACTURING
c·oMPANY,
A ppeUarnt,
vs.

Case No. 8393

UTAH LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD and UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERI·CA, CIO,
Respondents.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This matter comes before the ·court on a Writ of
Review to review an order of the Utah Labor Relations
Board ·directed against Philip S. Guss doing business
as Photo Sound Products Manufacturing Company, a
sole proprietorship, requiring him to reinstate certain
ex-employees ·and to bargain collectively with United
Steelworkers of America, CIO. The Petition for Writ
of Review questions the jurisdiction of the Utah Labor
Relations Board under the cir·cumstances of this case
to issue such an order.
P. S. Guss is a Utah resident engaged in business
in Salt Lake City under the trade name of Photo Sound
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Products Manufacturing Company, hereinafter referred
to as Photo Soun·d. Photo Sound was set up by Mr.
Guss to perform contracts for the United States Air
Force for the design and manufacture of specialized
photographic equipment. That is and was its only fun-ction. (R. 121) The business during the period in question involved three Air Force contracts; one for chemical
mixers in the amount of $84,896.73, one for printers in
the amount of $37,222.42, and one for p·rint straighteners
in the amount of $2:9,906.35. (R. 12·5) To perform these
contracts for the Air Force, Photo Sound purchased
from sources outside the st·ate, stainless steel in an
amount "a little less than $50,000" (R.133). The finished
products were shipped to the Air Force at Wright-Patterson Field, Dayton, Ohio and other Air Force bases,
ineluding Hill Field, Utah, and other bases outside the
state. ( R. 124)
Shortly after the company started op·er·ating the
United Steelworkers of America, CIO, in December of
1953, filed with the National Labor Relations Board, a
petition for certification under the National Labor
Relations Act of that union .as the bargaining representatives for all of the ·employees of the company, except
elerical and supervisory employees, as defined in the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended. (R. 230) At
the time for hearing on the p:etition on January 19,
1954 (R. 176) the company and the union entered into
an ·agreement for a consent election to he conducted by
the National Labor Relations Board. (R. 233) Among
other things, this agreement recited that the employer,
2
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Photo Sound, was ''engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 3(6) (7) of the National Labor Relation Act. '' ( R. 233, par. 8)
The election was ~conducted by the National Board
on April 26, 1954 and was won ~by the union, 15 to 11.
(R. 233) Under date of May 4, 1954, the United Steelworkers of America, CIO, were duly certified by the
National Labor Relations Board pursuant to section 9(a)
of the National Labor Relations Act. (R.234)
Although no request to bargain was made by the
union until May 6, 19'54 (R. 2'36) (and although it had
won the election), on May 14, 1954, the union filed a
charge against Photo Sound with the National Labor
Relations Board ( R. 290) under sections 8 (a) (1), ( 3)
and (5) of the National Labor Relations Aet, as amended,
alleging that the company had been guilty of unfair
labor practices, including interference with the election,
discriminatory discharges and refusal to bargain. Also
during this period, the union published in the May, 1954
issue of the Utah CIO News (R. 291) a scurrilous attack
upon Philip S. Guss and Photo Sound. Because of this
hostile attitude of the union, Guss concluded that counsel
should be present at all collective bargaining negotiations. Such was the case in the negotiations which proceeded between the union and the company between June
1, 1954 and the end of July of that year.
During this same p·eriod, the National Labor Relations Board was investigating the -charges filed with it
~by the union. In July, 1954, the National Labor Relations
Board issued new "yardsticks" which it indicated it

3
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would apply to determine whether it would, in a particular case, exercise the exclusive jurisdiction granted it by
Congress. (NLRB Release No. R-445, July 1, 1954, and
No. R-449, July 15, 1954). Applying this new yardstick,
the National Board under date of July 21, 1954, ·declined
to ·consider the matter of the charges filed by the United
Steelworkers ·of America, CIO, against Photo Sound,
stating:
''Further proceedings are not warranted, inasmuch as the operations of the ·company involved
are predominately local in -character and it does
not appear that it would effectuate the policy of
the Act to exercise jurisdictio·n. I am therefore,
refusing to issue complaint in this matter." (R.
235)
The union, in ·this notice, was advised that it had the
right to a review of this action taken by the National
Board in declining to exercise its juris,diction, but no
app-eal was taken by the union. (R. 18)
On July 29, 1954, the union filed substantially the
same 0harge with the State Board (R. 1) that it had
p·reviously filed with the National Boar-d. No complaint
was issued by the State Board until January 14, 1955
and notice of hearing thereon issued the same date.
This was the first notice either Photo Sound or its
counsel had that the union had filed charges with the
State Boar~d.
At the hearing on the ·charges before the State Board
on F·ebruary 7, 1955, the company presented its contention that the matter was not within the jurisdiction of
the Utah Board ('R. 17) and objected to the introduc4
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tion of all evidence and other proc·eedings on the same
grounds (R 2.0). At the elose of the union's case, the
company renewed its motion to dismiss on the ground
that the proceedings were not within the juris·diction
of the State Board, but were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (R. 133).
The hearing examiner ruled that the business of
Photo Sound affected intrastate as well as interstate
commeree (R. 317), and concluded therefrom that the
State Board had jurisdiction. The Utah State Labor
Relations Board affirmed the ruling of the hearing
examiner (R. 329) and issued an ·order directing Photo
Sound to cease and desi·st from refusing to bargain
collectively with the CIO and directing it to take ·certain
affirmative action with respect to eertain of its ex-employees designated in the order. This Writ of Review
was obtained to question the jurisdiction of the Utah
Labor Relations Board to issue such an order.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD HAS
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE LABOR RELATIONS
OF PHOTO SOUND PRODUCTS MANUFACTURING CO·MPANY.
POINT TWO
ACTION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD IN DECLINING TO E'XERCISE ITS JURISDICTION
DOES NOT CONVEY JURISDICTION TO THE UTAH
BOARD.
A. The National Labor Relations Board has not ceded
jurisdiction.

5
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B. The refusa'l of the National Labor Relations Board
to exercise its jurisdiction, does not create jurisdiction in the
State Board.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BO·ARD HAS
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE LABOR RELATIONS
OF PHOTO SOUND PRO·DUCTS MANUFACTURING CO·MPANY.

The judicial plowing of the field of fe-deral-state
relationship in the administration of lahor relations since
the enactment of the Wagner L-abor Relations A·ct in
19a51 and its amendment in 1947 2 makes it clear that the
National Labor Relations Board has jurisdiction in this
matter and that such juris-diction of the National Board
is exclusive, Congress having preempted the field, except
for certain particular instances sp~ecifically spelled out
in the Act.
S·in·ce early in NLRA history the Supreme Court
has held that Congress intended to exercise the full scope
of its authority un,der the Commerce clause in the labor
relations fiel~d. In NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 US 1 (1939)
the Supreme Court held the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is plenary and extends to
all such commerce, be it great or small and that;
''The Act, on its face, thus evidences the
intention of Congress to exercise whatever power
is {~onstiutionally given it * * * we ·can perceive
no basis for inferring any intention of Congress
to make the op~eration of the Act ·depend upon
any particular volume of commerce ·affected * • * ''
1

1

2

29 USC § 151-166, 49 Stat. 457.
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136.

6
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The trial exarmner of the Utah Labor Relations
Board, without referring to the approximately $50,000.00
worth of purchases in interstate ·commeree of Photo
Sound found:
"It must be conceded that the Respondent is
manufacturing products almost all of which are
shipped outside the State of Utah. It is also true
that a large amount of the dollars expended in
performing these contracts are spent for labor
and the purchase of materials on a local level.
It is thus apparent, that intrastate ·commeree as
"\Vell as interstate commerce is affected by this
dispute." (R. 317)
Since the Board found that interstate commerce
as well as intrastate is affected by ·the dispute between
Photo Sound and the CIO, it is clear that the labor relations of Photo Sound Products Manufacturing Company,
and particularly -charges of discrimination and refusal
to bargain, matters expressly dealt with by Section 8(a)
(1), (3) and (5) of the National Act, are within the
National Board's exclusive jurisdiction. Santa Cruz
Packing Co. vs. NLRB, 303 US 453, (1938). Other cases
holding on facts similar to those established with respect
to Photo Sound, that the National L·abor Relations Board
has jurisdiction and has exercised such jurisdiction,
might be cited ad infinitum, but as the principle is so
clear, this brief will not be unduly lengthened by such
enumeration. In almost every ease affecting interstate
commerce, boih intrastate commerce and loeal lahor
are involved, but unless the doctrine of de minimis be
''maximized'' to an extent far beyond that reeognized by

7
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the courts, the National Board's jurisdiction attache&,
and that jurisdiction is exclusive. Bethlehem Steel Comparny vs. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330
US 767 (1946), LaCrosse Telephone Company vs. WisconsVn Employment Relatio~JtS B.aa,rd., 336 US 18 (1948)
and Plakinton Packing Company vs. Wisconsin Emp,loyment Relations Board, 338 US 953 (19·50).
In the Bethlehem Steel case, the issue of the federalstate relationship was firs~t adjudicated b;y the Supreme
Court. The issue there was whether the New York
Board ·could certify a formen's union in an industry
subject to the National Labor Relrutions Act where the
National Board had refused to certify such union as
a matter of Board policy. The Sup·reme Court held that
certification of such union by the State Board was
invalid as in conflict with the National Act an~d the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. In so holding the
Supreme Court stated:
"'Comp,arison of the state and federal statutes, will show that both governments have laid
hold of the s-ame relation for regulation, and it
involves the same employers and the same employees. Each is delegated through administrative
authority, a wide discretion in applying this plan
of regulation to specific cases, and they are governed by somewhat different standards. Thus, if
both laws are upheld, two administrative bodies
are asserting a discretionary control over the
same subject mat~ter, conducting hearings, supervising elections, and determining the appropriate
unit for bargaining in the same p·lant. * * * We
therefore conclude, that it is beyond the power

8
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of New York to apply its policies to these Appellants, as attempted herein.''
In LaCrosse Telephone Co. vs. Wisconsin Board,
supra, the .Supreme Court of Wisconsin had held
that the Wisconsin Board could exercise its jurisdiction
to determine and certify appropriate bargaining units
until the National Board undertook to act. The Supreme
Court of the United States rejected this view on the
authority of the B ethelehem Steel case.
The Plankinton Packing Co. case was one involving
unfair labor practices, rather than certification of appropriate bargaining units. The Supreme Court of the
United States, in a per curiam decision, citing the
Bethelehem Steel and LaCrosse Telephone Comp·any
case, held the vVisconsin Board to be without jurisdiction
in such a rna tter.
In Garner vs. Teamsters Union, 346 US 485, (1953)
the Supreme Court applied the same principle to state
courts as it had to state boards in the Bethlehem Steel
and La1Crosse Telephone cases, and held that the Pennsylvania court had no jurisdiction to enjoin picketing
practices which were in violaton of both state and federal
law. The Supreme Court said:
''Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced by any tribunal
competent to apply law generally to the parties.
It went on to provide primary interpretation and
application of its rules to a specific and specially
constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular
procedure for investigation, complaint, notice and
hearing thereon, including judicial relief, pending
9
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a final administrative order. Congress evidently
considered that centralized administration of
specially designated procedures was necessary to
obtain uniform application of its substantive rules
and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely
to result from a variety of local procedures and
attitudes toward local controversies. * * *
A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of
procedure are quite as apt to produee incompatible or conflicting adjudication, as are different
rules of substantive law. The sa.m.e re.asoiiJ'I)ing that
prohibit Federal ·Courts from intervenin.g in
swch oases, exc-ept by way of review, or by .apvp~lica
tion of the Fe.derril Board, precludes state courts
from doing so. [citing c:ase.s] And the reasons for
excluding state administrative bodies from assuming control of matters exp·ressly placed w·ithin the
confines of the Federal Board, also exclud-e state
courts from like action.'' (emphasis supplied.)
The rule established by the Supreme Court of the
United States has 'been aptly summarized by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Pittsburg Railw~ays vs. Division 85, Amalg.amated Association of Street Railw:ay
Emp-loyees of America, 357 Pa. 379, 54 At. 2d 891, 174
ALR 1045:
''The clear implication of the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Bethelehem Steel vs. New York State Labor Relations
Board, 330 US 767, is that wherever the employeremployee relationship is on·e over which Congress
has power of regulation and with regard to which
Congress has acted, state power is suspended
and cannot constitutionally be exercised. * * * The
·criterion to ·determine the validity of the exercise
of state power is not whether the agency admini10
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stering federal law has acted upon the relation.
ship in a given case; rather it is whether Congress
has asserted its power to regulate that relationship."
The question of the exclusive jurisdiction of the
National Board, being so clearly established by the
Supreme Court of the United States, which has the final
word on this question, the only issue remaining in the
case at bar concerning the invalidity of the Utah Board's
order in this matter, is whether in any way the action
of the National Board in declining to exercise its jurisdiction to consider the unfair labor practice charge conveys any jurisdiction to the Utah State Board. It is
the position of Photo Sound that it does not.
POINT TWO
ACTION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD IN DECLINING TO EXERCISE ITS JURISDICTION
DOES NOT CONVEY JURISDICTION TO THE UTAH
BOARD.

A. Th'e National Labor aelations Board has not ceded
jurisdiction.

Section 10 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act
as amended in 1947 provides:
''The Board is empowered, as hereinafter
provided, to prevent any person from engaging
in any unfair labor practice affecting commerce.
This power shall not be affe·cted by any other
means of adjustment or prevention that has been
or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise; Provided, That the Board is empowered by
agreement with any agency of any State or Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any
cases in any industry (other than mining, manu11
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facturing, communications, and transportation
except where predominantly local in character)
even though su·ch cases may involve labor disputes
affe:cting commerce, unless the provision of the
State or Territorial statute applicable to the determination of such cases by such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this
Act or has received a construction inconsistent
therewith. ''
There is no contention here that the National Board
has entered into an agreement with the Utah Board to
cede its jurisdiction. In the La'Crosse Telephone case,
the Supreme c·ourt referred to this provision and stated:
"The result we have reached is not changed
by the Labor Management Rel·ations Act of 1947.
That .A!ct grants the National Board authority,
un·der specified conditions, to cede its jurisdiction
to a state agency, but it does not appear that there
has been any cession of jurisdiction to Wisconsin
by the National Board in any representation proceeding.''
The New York eourt, in New York State Labor Relations Board vs. Wags Transp:artation Comp·any, 130
N.Y. Supp. 2d 731 makes clear that section lO(a) defines
the only procedure for ceding of federal jurisdiction to
a state board. The court there said :
''In adopting the proviso of section 10( a),
the clear policy of Congress was to prevent the
application of state law and p·rocedure which did
not conform to the Taft-Hartley Act. Congress
was not unaware of the early practice of ceding
practice· to loeal boards. Indeed, it considered the
method desirable, but limitations were placed
up·on su'Ch ·cession. App·arently, Congress decided

12
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it was more important to have no cession than to
have it without complying with the standard prescribed. A secondary purpose may well have been
to encourage state legislation to adopt the TaftHartley provisions. * * *
''It follows quite logically that Congress provided in seetion 10 (a) the sole means of transferring to state jurisdiction activities which are
subject to the National Labor Relations Act as
ainended. * * *
"It is important that since the Bethlehem
decision, Congress enacted the proviso to section
10(ia) which prescribes the exclusive means for
transferring the jurisdiction of the National
Board to a state agency.
''This case involves a company subject to
the National Act and Board. The substantive
unfair labor practices are the same under federal
and state .acts.
"It only remains to decide whether the restrictive proviso on cession ·c'Omes within the geneneral rule stated in the Bethlehem case, that
state action is pre·cluded 'if it is clear that Congress has intended no regulation except its own.'
"Section lO(a) does prohibit cession except
on specified terms. The fact that there are limited
exceptions does not vitiate the power of Congress
to prevent state action. Indeed, the proviso withdrew from the National Board the authority it
had exercised prior to 1947 to cede jurisdiction on
its own terms.
''The Respondent correctly argues, in effect,
that the National Board cannot do by abdication
what it cannot do by agreement.''

13
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See also A. E. Nettleton Co. vs. United ShoeJnaket·s
of America, 010, 28 Labor Cases, para. 69,211 (N.Y.
March, 1955). .
This position has been recognized by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, another jurisdiction where the statefederal jurisdictional question over labor relations has
been litigated numerous times. In 'Wisconsin Ernp~loy
ment Relations Board vs. Cha;uffeurs, Team.sters, etc.,
66 N.W. 2d 218 (1954) an unfair labor practice charge
had been filed with the Wisconsin Board by the company
against the union. The union filed an answer alleging
that under the National Act its activities were regulated
by and subject to the 'exclusive jurisdiction of the National Board. The State Board made findings and conclusions to the effect that the picketing was in violation
of Wisconsin statutes and filed a petition for enforcement of its order in the Circuit Court for Milwaukee
County. A temporary restraining order was issued by
that court and subsequently that court entered a judgment enforcing the court or·der. The matter was th·en
appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court where the
decision of the lower court and of the State Board
was reversed. The Wisconsin Court made it clear that
where activity of a labor union in picketing to coerce
an employer to interfere with an employee's rights to
refrain from joining or .assisting a labor union constitutes an unfair labor practice under both the National
Act and the State Act, the National Board has exclusive
jurisdiction and a state board or court may not act
in such .a case. It held that where the unfair labor prac-

14
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tice eomplained of was unla-\vful under both the state
and the national acts a state hoard or court could
have jurisdiction only if the state statute was similar
to the Nati'Onal Act and the National Board had ceded
its jurisdiction to the state agency under the provisions
of Section lO(a) of the National Act. The Wisconsin
Court said:
''If the laws are analagous the only result
is that in its discretion the National Board may
cede jurisdiction to the state. Section 10( a) of the
Act, as amended, makes it clear that the state does
not have jurisdiction of this type of case in its own
right." (emphasis supplied.)
T·o the same effect is a decision of the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas in Ad,elphia Cons. Co.
vs. Building .and Con. Trades Council of Philadelphia, 27
Labor Cases, par. 68,843 (Penn., 1954).
Inasmuch as there is nothing in the record indicating
a cession by the National Board to the Utah State Board
of jurisdiction over Photo Sound, the only question is,
could the state board, by the mere fact of the refusal of
the National Board to exercise its jurisdiction, obtain
jurisdiction~

B. The refusal of the National Labor Relations Board
to exercise its jurisdiction, does not create jurisdiction in
the State Board.

Under the authorities cited and quoted above, it is
incontravertible that the National Board would and does
have jurisdiction in this matter. The only ne;w fact in
the case is that the National Board, midway in its handling of the labor relations of Photo Sound, for budgetary
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or other reasons, best known to the board, changed its
policy and declined to exercise its jurisdiction in this and
other cas.es involving businesses the size and nature of
Photo Soun·d. It has not, by the adoption of these ne'v
standards or "yardsticks," held that it no longer has
jurisdiction.
Similar yardsticks in the exercise of its discretion
to take jurisdiction were first announced by the National
Board in October, 1950. In a press release dated October
5, 1950, the Board announced:
''The time has come when experienee warrants the establishment and announce:ment of certain standards which will better clarify and define
where the difficult line can best be drawn.
''The Board has long been of the opinion that
it would better effectuate the purposes of the
act and promote the prompt handling of major
cases, not to exercise its jurisdiction to the fullest
possible extent under the authority delegated to
it by C ong·ress, but to limit that exercise to enterprises whose operations have, or at which labor
disputes woul~d have, a pronounced impact upon
the flow of interstate com.meree. This policy
should in our opinion be mamtained.
''The Board thereby reiterated its policy of
not exercising jurisdiction despite its power to do
so, over businesses so local in character that a
sufficient impact upon interstate commerce to
justify an already burdened Federal Board ~n
expevnding tim.e, energy amd public {11.1YlAds."
(emphasis supplied.)
The right of the National Board to use diseretion
in determining whether to exercise its jurisdiction under
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such yardsticks has heen upheld, Haleston Drug Stores
vs. NLRB, 187 Fed. 2d, 418, (CA 9, 19•51), and has been
recognized in a left-handed way by the Supreme Court
of the United States in NLRB vs. Building and Constrvuction Tr.ad.es C ou.ncil, 341 U;S. 675, (19·51) where it said:
''Even when the effect of the activities on
interstate commerce is sufficient to enable the
Board to take jurisdiction of a company, the Board
'Sometimes properly declines to do so, stating
that the policy of the Act would not be effectuated
by its assertion of jurisdiction in that case."
In 1954, effective July 1 and July 15 of that year,
the National Board made an announcement of a revision
of its yardsticks which affected its discretion to exercise
its jurisdiction. In that press release the Board stated:
"The National Labor Relations Board today
announced seven changes in its standards for
determining whether the Board will take jurisdiction of a case. The earlier standards were adopted
in October, 1950. The Board has discretion in
which cases of those affecting interstate commerce it will exercise jurisdiction."
It was only arter this latest revision of its yardsticks that
the National Board declined to assert its jurisdiction over
the unfair labor practice charges filed with it by the
CIO aganst Photo Sound.
The true nature of this exercise of discretion not
to act was made clear by the First Circuit in NLRB vs.
Star Beef Company, 193 Fed. 2d 8 (1951). In that case
the employer contended that because the Board had declined to assert jurisdiction in the past, it could not now
do so in the application of a different administrative
policy. The eourt said:
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''The simple answer to this is that the Board
has jurisdiction all the time. National Labor Relations Board vs. Jones and Laughlin, 301 U.S.
1. The Board's exercise of discretion here does
not enlarge or exceed its jurisdiction so as to
prejudice this respondent, since the acts complained of, if proved, would violate the act and
redress can be procured under it.''
The history of the l(inard case (Buildilng Trades
Cowncil vs. Kilnard, 346 U.S. 933 (1954)) indicates the
foregoing analysis is correct. In the Alabama State
Court, the plaintiff was seeking an injunction contending
that the National Board had indicated that under its 1950
jurisdictional standards it would decline to assert jurisdiction and that therefore, the doctrine which became
fixed by the Garner case would not apply. The Alabama
Supreme Court agreed, stating in Kinard Construction
vs. Building Trades Council, 64 So. 2d 400, that the right
of the plain tiff to an injunction is con trolled by the
question of whether the labor union was shown to have
committed an unfair labor practice under the Act and
its effect on commerce is within the limits set by the
Board for the exercise of its jurisdiction. The Supreme
C'ourt of the United States reversed (Building Trades
Council vs. Kinard, supra).
The Supreme Court of the United States applied
the same approach in the Bethlehem Steel case when it
denied the right of the state board to act. Bethlehem
Steel vs. New York State Labor Relations Bo.ard, supra,
stating:
"It is clear that the failure of the National
Labor Relations Board to entertain foremen's
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petitions was of the latter class. [where failure
of federal officials affirmatively to exercise their
full authority takes on the character of a ruling
that no such regulation is appropriate or approved pursuant to the policy of the statute]
There was no administrative concession that the
nature of these appellants' business put their employees beyond reach of federal authority. The
Board several times entertained similar proceedings by other employees whose right rested on the
same words of Congress. Neither did the National
Board ever deny its own jurisdiction over petitions because they were by foremen. Re Soss Mfg.
Co. 56 NLRB(F) 348. It made clear that its refusal to designate foremen's bargaining umits w·as
a determination and an exercise of its d'iscretion
to determine that such units we.re not ap'propriate
for bargaining purposes. Re Maryland Drydock
Co. 49 NLRB(F) 733. We cannot, therefore, deal
,vith this as a case where F·ederal power has been
delegated but lies dormant and unexercised.
(emphasis supplied.)
Congress was not unaware of this approach of the
Supreme Court when it passed the Taft-Hartley Act.
See H.R. Rep. No. 235 on H.R. 3020, 80th Cong. 1st
Sess. p. 44. As pointed out by the Supreme Court itself
in Amalgamated Association of Street, Ele~ctric and Railway Employees vs. WERE, 340 US 383 (1951):

'' * * * The legislative history of the 1947 Act
refers to the decision of this Court in Bethlehem
Steel Co. vs. N·ew York Labor Board, 330 U.S.
767 (1947), and~ in its handling of the problems
presented by that case, Congress demonstrated
that it knew how to cede jurisdiction to the states.
Congress k:new full well that its labor legislation
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'preempts the field that the act covers insofar as
commerce within the meaning of the act is eoncerned' and demonstrated its ability to spell out
with particularity those areas in which it desired
state regulation to be operative."
There are two areas left to state control. One is the
area whieh is not governed by Federal legislation. See
Allen-Br,adley Local vs. Board, 315 U.S. 740 (1942), .Auto
Workers vs. Wis. Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949) and .Algoma
Plywood Co., vs. Wis. Board, 336 U.S. 301 (1949). The
other area is where Congress has preserved the right of
state action in the face of Federal legislation which
would otherwise exclude it. See for example, Sec. 14(b)
of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 authorizing the so-called "right to work" legislation.
Apparently, it was the decision of Congress to meet
the possibilities of a jurisdictional hiatus raised by the
Bethlehem Steel Comp,an;y ease, by authorizing the National Board to cede jurisdiction in certain circumstances
to the state boards.
A statement of the Supreme Court confirms this interpretation of section 10(a). It was said in the Algoma
Plywood Go. vs. Wis. Board case, supra, at 313, that the
purpose of the amendment of section 10(a) in the 1947
Act to insert the p,roviso giving the· National Labor Relations Board the power to make cession agreements was:
'' ... to meet situations made possible by the
Bethlehem case where no state agency would be
free to take jurisdiction of cases over whieh the
N·ational Board has declined jurisdiction.''
However. its desire to secure uniformity established as
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a condition precedent the requirement that the state
law be similar to the Taft-Hartley Act. The fact that
neither Utah nor any other state has seen fit to amend
its state law to conform to the National Act and thus
become eligible for cession of authority from the National
Board does not give the Utah State Board the right to
act contrary to the express provisions of the Congres-sional Act. If the Utah Legislature deems the no-man's
land created by the application of the Congres,sional rules
and the decisions of the Supreme Court to be an unfortunate one, it need only amend the Utah Act to make
the Utah Board eligible for delegation of authority from
the National Board.
The principle involved in the case at bar should be
clearly distinguishable from the issue which troubled
this court in Utah Labor Relations Board vs. Utah Valley
Hospital, 235 P. 2d 520 (1951) and the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Utah Valley Hospital
vs. Utah Labor Relations Board, 199 Fed. 2d 6 (1952).
In the Hos·pital case Congress had taken away the jurisdiction of the National Board over charitable hospitals.
Of course, that left the Utah Board free to act. Here,
however, it is not ·c,ongress, but the National Board in
its transitory use of its discretion, that denies to the
union the facilities of the National Act.
In two recent state cases this distinction has been
made clear. In both the state courts recognized that until
Congress acted, the use of the National Board's discretion in not exercising its jurisdiction would not create
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any jurisdiction in the state. New York State Labor
Relations Boa.rd vs. ·wags Transportation System, supra,
Universal Car d!; Service Co. vs. lAM, (Michigan, 1954)
27 CCH Labor Cases, par. 68,825.
Finally, the latest and most authoritative decision
on this federal question is the very recent decision of the
Court of A·ppeals for the T·enth ·Circuit (Ret.ail Clerks
Local1564 AFL vs. Your Food Stores of S(JJYI;·t~a Fe, Inc.
(;CA 10, August 4, 19~5'5), 28 c:c·H Labor Cases, par.
69,4t5').
In that case, an action for an injunction against unlawful picketing was filed in the state court. The matter
was then removed to the New Mexico Federal District
Court where a motion to dismiss and to dissolve the
temporary restraining order was granted1 under authority of the Garner and Amazon cases. Thi's judgment
was never appealed and no motion to remand to the
state court was ever filed. In July of 1954, some seven
weeks after entering of the judgment in that case the Regional Director of the NLRB advised both parties by
letter that the Store's interstate operations did not app,ear to meet any of the n:ewly announced ''standards for
the assertion of jurisdiction'' anrd that the director was
therefore refusing to issue a complaint against the Store
in response to the union's charges. Thereafter the union
resumed its peaceful picketing and the store again instituted an action in the state court and obtained another
temp.orary injunction. The union then instituted an
action in the F·ederal District Court to stay the injunc1

2

Your Food Stores vs. Retail Clerks, 121 F. Supp. 339 (1954)
Am-azon Cotton Mills Co. vs. Textile Union, 167 Fed. 2 183

(CA 4 1948)
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t :on

issued by the state court. The trial court refused
to interfere with the state court injunction under its
interpretation of the Federal Judicial Code. 3 On appeal
the Circuit Court reversed, stating with respect to the
point pertinent to the case at bar:
''Moreover, the refusal by the NLRB to
entertain the instant grievance on its merits did
not of itself alter the pertinent law thereby revesting the state court with authority to proceed.
Amended Section lO(a) of the Act specifically
provides what this Court deems to be the only
"\vay state authorities can be vested with authority
now within the exclusive purview of the Act.
Unless and until there is an express ceding of
jurisdiction to a proper state agency exclusive
jurisd,iction remains in the fede~al agency. For
sake of order such must be true. Otherwise, an
interminable problem of determining jurisdiction
would exist, throwing needless confusion into an
area clearly preempted by Congress.'' (emphasis
supplied.)
This leaves only the argument advanced by the union
before the Utah State Board, in its brief filed in response
to the request of the hearing examiner, that the effect
of this ruling is to leave a void in which the National
Board refuses to act and the State Board has no power
to act. The Circuit Court answered this argument by
inserting as a footnote, the following quotation from
the Universal Car Co. case, supra:
"If the jurisdiction of the state courts is to
depend-not upon the act of Congress and the
actual jurisdiction of the NLRB-but upon the
8

124 F. Supp. 697 (1954)
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day-to-day or month-to-month discretionary exercise of jurisdiction by the Board, dependent upon
changing budgetary conditions or upon its economic, social or political views at the moment,
then neither the courts nor the litigants can know
with any certainty where jurisdiction lies, nor
whether in a given case jurisdiction existing at
the time of its commencement will continue until
its final decision."
In short, the argument as to the wisdom of the vesting
by Congress of the exclusive jurisdiction with the Nationa! Board and the choice of the National Board not
to exercise such jurisdiction involves neither this court
nor the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Such
argument should he addressed to Congress.
This point is summarized very well in an article in
the January, 19'55 is-sue of Labor Law Journal, at page
3 entitled "NLRB Jurisdictional Policies and the Federal-State Relationship'' by Fred Witney, professor of
economics at the University of Indiana. The author
states:
' 'In the exercise of its judicial function, the
Supreme Court must take federal legislation as
enacted. With res·pect to the p~roblem of federalstate jurisdiction, the Court must he governed by
the express provisions of the national law. As
demonstrated, Congress spelled out in detail those
areas of lahor relations over which it desired
the states to exercise concurrent jurisdiction with
the federal government. Congress likewise established a limited scheme whereby the N.L.R.B.
could cede jurisdiction to the states. It is submitte·d that the Supreme Court would rea·d much
more into Section lO(a) of the federal law than
actually exists if it holds that mere contraction of
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jurisdiction by the N.L.R.B. permits state activity
within interstate co1nmerce. If the N.L.R.B. has
created mischief by establishing a 'no-man's land'
in industrial relations, it is not within the power
of the Supreme Court to correct this state of
affairs by a decision which would be inconsistent
with the national law.
''In the last analysis, it is the Congress and
not the N.L.R.B. which determines fundamental
national labor policy. It would appear that 'the
criterion to determine validity of the exercise of
state power is not vvhether the agency administering federal law has acted upon the relationship in
a given case; rather, it is whether Congress has
asserted its power to regulate that relationship.'
Congress, and not the ambivalent policies of an
administrative agency, determines the point at
which states may operate in an area reserved to
the federal government by the Constitution of the
United States. It might have been unwise for
the national lawmakers to establish a procedure
so strict and limited in character that it precludes
federal cession or jurisdiction to state control.
But the Supreme Court must be controlled by the
provisions of national law passed pursuant to the
Constitution, regardless of its merits or wisdom.' H
Congress has, in fact, given consideration to the
problem. Attempts to release the strict conditions which
limit the freedom of the National I_jabor Relations Board
to eede jurisdiction under section 10 (a) were made at the
See alrso 67 Harvard Law Review, 1297 "Federalism in
the Law of Labor Relations" by Archibald Cox, June, 1954, and
43 Georgetown Law Review, 67, (1954), "No Man's Land in
Labor Relations-A Survey." For an article attacking the Wlsdom of the Board's policy see "NLRB Absolutism, a Dogma Revisited" Labor Law Journal, May, 1955, p. 279, by Roche and
Henslowe. See also Hay "Federalism and Labor Relations in
the United States" 102 Pennsylvania Law Review 959.
1
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2nd session of the 83rd Congress. The Senate Labor
Committee, acting upon the recommendation of President Eisenhower, embodied the following provision in a
proposed bill to amend the Taft-Hartley law.
" Sec. 6 (b) (1) The Board, in its discretion,
may decline to assert jurisdiction over any lahor
dispute where, in the opinion of the Board, the
effect on commerce is not sufficiently substantial
to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction. (2)
Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to prevent or
bar any agency, or the courts of any State or
Territory, from assuming and asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the Board declines, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, to assert jurisdiction.''
(See Sen. Rep. No. 11211 on S.B. 2650, 83rd
Cong. 2d s.ess. 28 (19 54) ).
Such a provision would answer the problem raised in
the case at ·bar. While this proposal has, up to now,
shared the same fate as other Taft-Hartley amendments,
it is submitted that such Congressional action is the
only answer. This court can do no more than apply the
law as it exists.
1

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons it is submitted that the
Utah Labor Relations Board has no jurisdiction in the
case at bar and that its order directed against Photo
Sound should he reversed on that ground.
Respectfully submitted,
Peter W. Billings
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT &
MABEY
Attorneys for Appellant.
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